Steven G. Smith, THE ARGUMENT TO THE OTHER: REASON BEYOND REASON IN THE THOUGHT OF KARL BARTH AND EMMANUEL LEVINAS by Long, Eugene Thomas
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers 
Volume 2 Issue 1 Article 10 
1-1-1985 
Smith, THE ARGUMENT TO THE OTHER 
Eugene T. Long 
Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy 
Recommended Citation 
Long, Eugene T. (1985) "Smith, THE ARGUMENT TO THE OTHER," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the 
Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 2 : Iss. 1 , Article 10. 
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol2/iss1/10 
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and 
creative exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. 
88 Faith and Philosophy 
attempted to set out a philosophically clear statement of the relation between 
relativism and truth. That, of course, was really Troeltsch's task and one which 
occupied him and the religionsgeschichtliche Schule for some time and without 
notable success. But it would have been interesting to see Rubanowice wrestle 
more thoroughly with the matter. 
Troeltsch's religionsgeschichtliche method and his notion of polymorphous 
truth carry over into his philosophy of history. There is, he claimed, "not merely 
one logic of human thinking, but various logics." Again, this is an interesting 
claim but one which needs careful philosophic analysis. 
The final chapter of this work traces Troeltsch's life in politics from 1914 to 
1923. It shows an intellectual tom by his complicated view of history and religion 
and by his Germanness. 
A final epilogue rejects the conventional judgment that Troeltsch failed to 
resolve the crisis of values he had uncovered. Rubanowice believes that the 
answer is ambiguous. That Troeltsch was an important thinker Rubanowice quite 
rightly leaves in no doubt. I would quarrel with ranking Troeltsch beside Hegel, 
but that he belongs with Ritschl and Schleiermacher seems quite right. 
The book has a superb selected bibliography. Some might argue that 820 
footnotes in a 138-page volume are a bit much. However, intellectual historians, 
while often not given to much philosophic analysis, are known for their meticul-
ousness. This book is a fine and meticulous intellectual history of a complicated 
theologian who profoundly displayed the nature of the crises we live with yet. 
The Argument To The Other: Reason Beyond Reason in the Thought of Karl 
Barth and Emmanuel Levinas, by Steven G. Smith. Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 
1983. Pp. 307. $20.95. 
Reviewed by EUGENE THOMAS LONG, University of South Carolina. 
This comparative study of Karl Barth and Emmanuel Levinas was the author's 
dissertation directed by William Poteat at Duke University. Although there is 
no evidence that either Barth or Levinas was influenced by the other, and although 
Barth appeals primarily to the Christian faith and Levinas to phenomenology 
and the Jewish faith, Smith argues that they share in common a preoccupation 
with transcendence or the Other which changes the ground rules for thinking 
and speaking of God, and hence for philosophy and theology. For Karl Barth 
the Other is the transcendent God of Biblical Christian faith whose infinite 
qualitative difference from man and the world makes impossible any analogy in 
human experience. For Levinas the Other is the other person, ultimately the 
other person in his nearness to God, but this Other is also said to be beyond the 
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reach of efforts to think conceptually. Although the Other is not identified in 
the same way by Barth and Levinas, each is said to employ what Smith calls 
an argument to the Other. In this argument it is the Other who justifies, not we. 
From this point of view our way of thinking and speaking about ultimate reality 
is radically transformed. 
Smith traces Barth's development of this argument between 1909-1961 and 
1961-1975. Impressed by Kierkegaard's assertion of the infinite qualitative dif-
ference between God and man, Barth from First Romans forward begins to 
overthrow the tradition of his teacher, Wilhelm Hermann. True knowledge of 
God, Barth argued on New Testament grounds, is beyond experience and con-
ceptualization. God can be spoken of only as wholly other and the only warrant 
for doing so is his revelation in Jesus Christ. This concept of the wholly other, 
however, is not a doctrine of God. It is a statement of the proper relation of 
theology to God. Theology exists in total dependence on the grace of God; all 
religious givens are rejected. If, however, the possibility of thinking of God 
from within human experience and thinking is rejected and if God stands in 
judgment on all human speech calling it into question, one needs to ask whether 
or not it makes sense to speak of God at all. To this question Barth answers that 
revelation has to create the contact point in man. Analogia entis is replaced by 
analogia fidei. God preserves his otherness through the incommensurability of 
his Word with all human words and systems of thought. In Barth's later work 
it is man's witness to the revelation of God's Word in the Bible as preached 
which leads him from a merely negative to a more positive statement of the 
otherness of God. 
Levinas, early influenced by Husser! and Heidegger, found in Being and Time 
a new appreciation for the Biblical view of man as historical and creaturely. 
Becoming convinced, however, of the failure of modem society as a community 
of free and rational wills, he began to develop a philosophy of transcendence 
which takes him beyond experience and subjectivity in the western tradition, as 
he understands them. He accepted Heidegger's critique of rationalist views of 
the freedom of reason and consciousness from history but turned Heidegger's 
question of the Being of human existence upside down. Instead of asking about 
the Being of human existence, Levinas focuses on what it means to saM' that 
there are beings in Being. This question was motivated by ethical considerations 
and by what he considered to be the breakdown of western morality. The otherness 
of the other person becomes central for Levinas' thought and religion comes to 
be understood as a relation with a person as an end in himself. Since the Other 
is held to be prior to freedom and thought the foundation of morality cannot be 
found in the theoretical, practical or ethical dimensions of consciousness. The 
moral demand of the Other is prior to all conscious meaning. Thought and action 
presuppose the Other. In his later work the absoluteness of the Other becomes 
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more and more the focus of Levinas' thought, and its connection with God 
becomes a central issue. Descartes' idea of the infinite becomes important in 
this development, for Descartes had himself called the ego into question by the 
priority assigned to the infinite. Descartes does not arrive at the infinite, argues 
Levinas, by negating the imperfections of existence. Rather the idea of the Other 
makes its claim on the one who has it, calling into question his efforts to think 
it from within the limits of his own subjectivity. This approach comes to full 
expression in Otherwise than Being published in 1974. God is now understood 
to confer otherness on the other person. The other person and his neighbor now 
stand before me designated by God as making a moral claim on my way of 
being. The human agent is transformed from the thinking subject to one who is 
subject to the moral claims placed upon him. To speak of god is to speak of 
human relations. Outside the ethical, it seems, God remains beyond all com-
prehension. 
In comparing Barth and Levinas, Smith argues that Barth's idea of God and 
Levinas' idea of the Other both exclude the possibility of talking about God as 
Subject, Being or History. The transcendent Other takes the initiative and in our 
thinking and speaking we are bound to it. Language becomes the vehicle of this 
address where language is understood as obedience to, listening to the Other. 
Language in this sense is not conceptualization. It appears to be some kind of 
performance or witnessing through which the Other speaks. Since the referent 
of this language remains beyond knowledge, language of the Other appears to 
invite the hearer to stand open to the Other's revelation. There is nothing in 
human experience, however, to which we may appeal to thematize and justify 
our Talk of God. Smith's discussion of the language issue is not detailed enough 
for me to understand exactly what is being said here. It appears, however, that 
in some sense the Other speaks in language to which we can only witness in 
obedience and through our speaking invite others to do the same. 
Smith is not of course arguing that Barth and Levinas are proceeding in the 
same way. Barth's conception of the Other is tied to the Church, the Bible and 
first century man whereas Levinas' Other is removed from all fixed reference 
points. Levinas writes as a phenomenologist and presents us with something 
other than a natural or revealed theology in the usual sense of those terms. Barth 
writes as a Christian theologian where the otherness of God is made concrete in 
the revelation in Jesus Christ. For Levinas the relation between man and man 
is the only basis for conversation of God. What they do share, according to 
Smith, is the idea of the Other which calls the thinker into question, demands 
obedience and stands apart from efforts to construe its content. 
Smith has provided his readers with a detailed study of the texts showing 
Barth's and Levinas' development towards their mature ideas of the Other and 
its implications for thinking and speaking of God. Just because he has remained 
BOOK REVIEWS 91 
so close to the texts and does little to place the discussion in the context of other 
efforts to deal with thinking and speaking of God, this is a difficult volume for 
persons who have not studied Barth and Levinas in detail. For persons, however, 
who are students of these two men the tracing of their development and the 
placing of their texts in historical context should be an important contribution. 
Although Smith is obviously a sympathetic interpreter of what he calls the 
argument to the Other, in this volume he does not respond critically to the 
argument. For myself, while I can understand why in the context of World War 
II and the holocaust and the apparent failure of human moral systems one would 
want to identify with the position represented by Barth and Levinas, I believe 
that much is lost if this position is taken as a model for responding to issues 
relating to knowledge and talk of God. But for now I must leave this merely as 
an asse11ion. 
